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INTRODUCTION
Everybody’s gone surfin’, surfin’ U.S.A. . . .
The Beach Boys1
Surfing the Internet is the latest wave to hit the nation.2
Government, commercial and educational institutions all have
web sites where browsers can access digital information on
everything from the latest copyright legislation to electronic-
saver (“E-Saver”3) airfares.  To take advantage of this powerful
informational tool, a person needs a computer, modem, and link
to the World Wide Web.4  For a fee, Internet service providers
(ISPs) such as America Online,5 provide Internet access for
home computers.  However, when a person is struggling to
afford food, shelter, and clothing, amenities such as a home
computer (particularly one with Internet access), remain a
distant dream.  Thus, for the poor and disenfranchised, public
libraries and schools offer the only possible opportunity to
“surf.”
As aptly put by Professor Robert Oakley, Director of
1. THE BEACH BOYS, SURFIN’ USA (Capitol Records).
2. Today, we globally refer to the National Information Infrastructure
(NII) as the “Internet.”  See Information Infrastructure Task Force,
Intellectual Property and the National Information Infrastructure (visited May
8, 2000) <http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/doc/ipnii/> (hereinafter White
Paper).  This paper uses NII and Internet interchangeably, with most frequent
reference to the Internet.  The Internet consists of a giant network
conglomerate running under a standardized set of protocols called the Internet
Protocols. See Needham J. Boddie et al., A Review of Copyright and the
Internet, 20 CAMPBELL L. REV. 193, 194 (1998).  Although funded by private
and federal sources, no single entity has control or ownership of the Internet.
See id. at 196.  It comprises over 15,000 individual networks and connects
approximately 9.4 million computers.  See id.
3. This term used by US Airways to market its bargain airfares that are
only offered electronically without any printed ticket issuing.  See US Airways,
E-Savers (visited Jan. 29, 2000) <http://www.usairways.com/travel/fares/
esavers.htm>.
4. The World Wide Web (WWW or “Web”) is actually but one part of the
Internet, although many people use the terms almost interchangeably.  See
Boddie supra note 2 at 201.  The emergence of the Web has, however, put a
user-friendly face on the information made available on the Internet by
providing integrated multimedia capabilities.  See id.  For example, a Web
user can read about a whale, watch a video of the whale, or listen to the whale
“speak,” all through the same user-friendly interface. An Internet browser
transforms the plain text of a file formatted in Hypertext Markup Language
(HTML) into a multimedia wonderland.  See id.
5. See America Online, Inc. (visited Jan. 29, 2000) <http://www.aol.com>.
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Georgetown University Law Center’s library, “[p]ublic access to
published information is the principle that has made libraries
so important to the ideals of American Democracy.”6  Similarly,
society’s moral commitment to public education and universal
access to information remain the cornerstone to economic
viability.
Americans at all socio-economic levels obtain vital
information through public education.  Indeed, we all view
public libraries as a source of both information and recreation.7
These venues are the sole gatekeepers of information resources
in poorer communities, where many lack discretionary funds to
spend on educational material.
In this era of high technology, children of all income levels
need access to both printed and electronic information.  Each
day, the educational gap widens between children accessing the
latest computer technology and children using out-dated
computers without Internet capabilities.8  The Library Bill of
Rights states that “[i]t should be the goal of libraries to develop
policies concerning access to electronic resources in light of
economic barriers to information access.”9
Increased government funding to public schools and
libraries in low-income areas is one means of upgrading
6. Prepared Testimony of Prof. Robert L. Oakley, On Behalf of the
American Association of Law Libraries Before the House Committee on
Commerce Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade and Consumer Affairs
Regarding Implementation of the December 1996 WIPO Copyright and
Phonogram Treaties, FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE (June 5, 1998) (hereinafter
Oakley Testimony).
7. According to the American Library Association, “Nearly 45% of all
households visited a public library within the last month.  Among households
with children under 18 years of age, 61% had visited a library within the last
month.”  ALA Office for Information Technology and Policy, The 1997 National
Survey of U.S. Public Libraries and the Internet: Summary Results November
18, 1997 (visited Dec. 3, 1997) <http://www.ala.org/oitp/research/plcon97pr.
html>.
8. See Internet Race Gap Expands Harrisburg Centers Fight the Trend by
Adding Computers, Harrisburg Patriot, July 9, 1999, (available at 1999 WL
5145454 (discussing one city’s attempt to narrow the gap).
9. ALA, American Library Association Office for Information Technology
Policy, Access To Electronic Information, Services, and Networks: an
Interpretation of the LIBRARY BILL OF RIGHTS. (visited April 13, 2000)
<http://www.ala.org/alaorg/oif/librarybillofrights.pdf> (Hereinafter Library
Bill of Rights)  The Library Bill of Rights is the American Library
Association’s formal statement on its ethical obligations to make all forms of
information accessible to the American public.  See id.
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available educational technology.10  There remains, however,
the legal impediment of handling the intellectual property
rights that attach to digital transmissions for education and
research.  The fair use doctrine of the Copyright Act shields
public schools from liability for copying portions of  printed
material for research or teaching.11  Similarly, the first sale
doctrine of the Copyright Act enables schools or libraries to
obtain hard text and control its future lending.12
Unfortunately, the Copyright Act is silent concerning
protection of public schools and libraries from liability for
supplying access to electronic transmissions.
This article analyzes how copyright law can be harmonized
with the ethics of providing equal access to high technology
information in public libraries and schools.  Part I establishes
that libraries and public schools are presently unable to provide
uniform access to high technology information.  I argue that
lack of funding for copyright licenses and fear of vicarious
liability for copyright infringement are key factors that impede
increased access to the Internet.
Part II analyzes the existing inadequacies in copyright law
10. The Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56
(codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-173 (1996)) (hereinafter 1996 Act) includes
provisions for establishing funding to ensure universal Internet access to
health providers, public schools, and libraries.  Section 254 of the 1996 Act
directs the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to implement a
program to meet Universal Service Goals that includes setting up a program
funded by certain ISPs and telecommunications carriers to subsidize
telecommunications service to rural health providers, libraries, public schools
and certain low income consumers.  47 U.S.C.A. § 254 (West Supp 1997).
Interestingly, “universal service” does not include copyright and other
licensing fees, but merely refers to “a reimbursement to telephone companies
for the difference between the cost of providing service and the amount
charged to any one consumer.”  Arturo Gándara, Essay, Equity in an Era of
Markets: The Case of Universal Service, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 107, 108 n.4
(1998).  Gándara further notes that “[t]o maintain service, for example
‘universal service,’ to such customers, all Customers are ‘taxed.’  Thus, the
‘taxes’ collected are redistributed to those companies that maintain those
customers on the network at below cost rates, in order to make those
companies whole.”  Id.
On May 8, 1997 the FCC adopted the recommendations of its Federal-
State Joint Board and issued its first implementing Order which clarified that
only “telecommunications carriers” must contribute to the Universal Fund,
although some non-telecommunications carriers may also provide some
services (for example, Internet access and inside wiring services).  Federal-
State Joint Bd. on Universal Serv., Report and Order, 7 Comm. Reg. (P & F)
109 (1997) (hereinafter Universal Serv. Report and Order).
11. See discussion infra II.B.
12. See discussion infra II.C.
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with respect to digital transmissions.  The Copyright Act of
1976 (the Act) protects literary, musical, graphic or artistic
works which are “fixed in a tangible medium of expression.”13
Section 106 of the Act outlines a series of exclusive rights
granted the copyright holder.14  These rights include: (1)
reproducing the copyright work in copies or phonorecords; (2)
preparing derivative works; (3) distributing copies by sale,
rental, lease or lending; (4) performing the work publicly;15 and
(5) displaying the work publicly.16  The Act also contains a
series of limitations that balance the public’s right to the free
dissemination of information against the copyright owner’s
ability to freely exploit her property.  First sale17 and fair use18
are two significant limitations that enable public schools and
libraries to distribute and copy many forms of copyrighted
information.
Libraries obtain their  “public lending right” from the first
sale doctrine.19  Section 109 of the Act states that
“[n]otwithstanding the provisions of section 106(3) [the
distribution right], the owner of a particular copy or
phonorecord . . . is entitled, without the authority of the
copyright owner, to sell, or otherwise dispose of the possession
of that copy . . . .”20  Thus, once a public library or school
lawfully obtains copyrighted material, it may freely distribute
or lend this material to the public, without paying royalties to
the copyright owners.  By design, first sale affects the
“distribution right” only.21  The remaining exclusive rights such
as the “right to reproduce” remain with the copyright holder
after the work’s transfer and/or sale.  As a result, libraries
cannot reproduce copyrighted works from their collection
13. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1996).  Section 102 goes on to clarify that the
“tangible medium of expression” includes that “now known or later developed,
from which they can be perceived, reproduced or otherwise communicated,
either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.”  Id.
14. 17 U.S.C § 106.
15. This provision applies to literary, musical, dramatic and
choreographic works.  See id.
16. See id.
17. See 17 U.S.C. § 109 (1996); see also infra II.C.  Public libraries also
derive certain reproduction rights for preservation and research from section
108 of the Act.  17 U.S.C. § 108 (1996).
18. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1996); see also infra II.B.
19. 17 U.S.C. §109.  See also Jennifer M. Schneck, Note, Closing the Book
on the Public Lending Right, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 878 (1988).
20. 17 U.S.C. §109(a) (emphasis added).
21. See 17 U.S.C. § 109.
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without seeking the benefit of fair use or other statutory
limitations.22
Fair use is a codification of common law, and allows for
copying certain portions of copyrighted material for “criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research,”
without infringing the copyright.23  Individuals often rely on
public libraries and/or schools for educational, research, or
scholarship information.  Thus, the fair use doctrine remains a
powerful tool for providing access to such information.
It is undisputed that the Copyright Act’s exclusive rights
and limitations protect copyrightable information contained in
hard text.24  Unfortunately, the Act is silent on how its
exclusive rights or limitations attach to copyrightable digital
transmissions.  Because digital transmissions from one
computer network to another are arguably “fixed” under section
102,25 the exclusive rights presently enumerated in the
Copyright Act probably protect Internet digital transmissions.
Similarly, first sale26 and fair use27 must liberally apply to
Internet material accessed for education, research, and
scholarship.  Unfortunately, only a few lobby on behalf of non-
profit libraries and schools, as opposed to the large number of
big, powerful firms representing the interests of copyright
owners.28  Thus, it is no surprise that the  “White Paper” issued
22. See 17 U.S.C. 109.  Public and school libraries, however, may also rely
on section 108’s limited reproduction rights for preservation and other
purposes.  See U.S.C.  108.
23. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1996).  In determining whether a use is “fair,” the
following factors are considered: (1) the purpose and character of the use; (2)
nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the
portion used in relation to the work as a whole; and (4) the effect of use upon
the work’s potential market.  See id.
24. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1996) (defining “literary works” including, for
example, books, periodicals, and manuscripts).
25. See, e.g., Advanced Computer Services of Michigan Inc. v. MAI
Systems Corp., 845 F. Supp. 356, 363 (E.D. Va. 1994) (holding that programs
stored only in RAM (random access memory) are “fixed” for purposes of the
Act).
26. See 17 U.S.C. § 109.
27. See 17 U.S.C. § 107.
28. See, e.g., the parties appearing at the Public Hearing on Intellectual
Property Issues Involved in the National Information Infrastructure Initiative
(visited Jan. 30, 2000)  <http://www.ilt.columbia.edu/text_version/projects/
copyright/papers/hearing.html>, including Vice Presidents of such companies
as Time Warner, the Motion Picture Association of America, and the
Recording Industry Association of America.  See also The Digital Future
Coalition (visited Jan. 31, 2000) <http://www.dfc.org/>.
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by President Clinton’s Working Group on Intellectual Property
states that the ethereal nature of digital transmissions and the
ease of undetectable copying29 necessitate amending existing
copyright law to ensure adequate protection for copyright
owners.30  The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998
(DMCA) addresses essential issues raised by the White Paper.
Although the DMCA deals extensively with limitations on
Internet service provider31 liability and the circumvention of
technical measures to prevent access to copyrighted works, it
fails to resolve the first sale discrepancy and gives lip service to
the fair use defense.  For example, section 1201 merely notes
that “[n]othing in this section shall affect rights, remedies,
limitations, or defenses to copyright infringement, including
fair use, under this title.”32
Part III evaluates sections of the White Paper relating to
public schools and libraries.  The White Paper proposes
amending the Copyright Act to clarify that digital
transmissions are both “reproductions” and “distributions.”33
This recommendation abolishes application of first sale to
Internet transmissions because that doctrine only limits the
copyright owner’s distribution right.34  If Internet transmissions
29. White Paper, supra note 2, at 12 (“Any two dimensional work can
readily be ‘digitized’—i.e. translated into a digital code (usually a series of
zeros and ones).  The work can then be stored and used in that digital form.
This dramatically increases: the ease and speed with which a work can be
reproduced;. . .the ability to manipulate and change the work; and the speed
with which copies (authorized and unauthorized) can be ‘delivered’ to the
public.”).
30. Id. at 211-12.
31. The DMCA refers to ISPs as “Online Service Providers,” this article
uses the term ISP in order to maintain consistency.
32. Pub. L. No. 105-304, § 1201(c)(3) (1998).  Section 1201 also indirectly
addresses fair use by delaying the prohibition of Technical Protection
Measures (“TPM”; a password or form of encryption used by a copyright holder
to restrict access to its materials) for 2 years to allow the Librarian of
Congress to evaluate several issues including the prohibition’s effect on
criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching scholarship and research.  Id. §
1201(a).  Finally,  section 512 of the DMCA limits ISP liability and notes that
the failure of an ISP to qualify for the DMCA limitations does not bear
adversely on the ISP’s ability to qualify for other defenses (such as fair use)
under the 1976 Copyright Act. Id. § 512.
33. Under the Copyright Act, supplying or lending the purchased copy of
printed material would trigger the distribution right only, not the right of
reproduction.  See generally supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
34. See 17 U.S.C. § 108(a).  Thus, under the proposed scenario when a
library purchases digital transmission rights, allowing others to access this
information would still violate the copyright owner’s exclusive right of
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are both reproductions and distributions, libraries cannot
digitally distribute (or provide additional access to) lawfully
obtained information, because each “distribution” also infringes
the copyright owner’s reproduction right.35
Part III also argues that the White Paper presents an
unduly narrow interpretation of fair use, which dilutes its
effectiveness in research and teaching.36  To avoid potential
liability, libraries and public schools must obtain blanket
licenses for digital works transmitted on the Internet.37  Digital
copyright fees are only one of the five major factors limiting
public libraries from providing access to the Internet.38
Part IV argues that society must harmonize its moral and
legal obligations to ensure that public schools and libraries
remain custodians of all information, both digital and printed.
Because copyrighted digital transmissions are “property,”
effective boundary lines must be drawn which balance the
public’s interest in the free dissemination of information
without diluting the economic value of the copyright.  To
preserve this balance, Congress should stand firm on
preserving the first sale and fair use limitations for both digital
and printed information.  If Congress accepts the White Paper’s
categorization of Internet transmissions as “reproductions” and
“distributions,” it should amend the first sale limitation to
allow non-infringing transfers of Internet transmissions.  One
solution is to allow the distribution and copying of digital
information as long as the digital transmitter deletes his or her
copy.  For public schools and libraries, a better solution is
enabling them to retain a “single” copy, in order to provide
reproduction.
35. See, e.g.,  White Paper, supra note 2.
36. Although the White Paper does not advocate abolishing fair use for
digital transmissions, its legal interpretation of this doctrine is so narrow that
it diminishes the doctrine’s future effectiveness in digital transmission cases.
See, e.g., White Paper, supra note 2, at 83-84 (“Fair Use Guidelines for
Libraries and Educational Institutions”), 73-82 (discussing case law that
conservatively analyzes the four factor test and leading cases in this area); see
also Pamela Samuelson, Legally Speaking, The NII Intellectual Property
Report, COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ACM, Dec. 1994, at 21, 24 (“It would be
inaccurate to say the [NII Report] recommends abolishing fair use law.  And
yet, it takes such a narrow view of existing fair use law and predicts such a
dim future for fair use law when works are distributed via the NII that the
report might as well recommend its abolition.”).
37. See John Carlo Bertot et al., The 1997 National Survey of U.S. Public
Libraries and the Internet (November 1997).
38. See id.
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continued access.  Notice of potentially infringing uses would be
required, similar to notices presently provided by public
libraries at copying machines.
Regarding fair use, Congress and courts must reinforce fair
use as an equitable doctrine that broadly applies to both digital
and printed copyrightable information.  They should explicitly
reject the White Paper’s position that narrows fair use in the
digital transmission context.  The article concludes that
harmonizing copyright law with Internet ethics paves the way
for all children to access the Internet, allowing them to become
viable contributors to our high-technology environment.
I. LIBRARIES AND PUBLIC SCHOOLS CANNOT
PROVIDE UNIFORM ACCESS TO HIGH TECHNOLOGY
INFORMATION
John Dixon, a freckle-faced fifth grader at Anderson Elementary, calls
himself a computer buff.  But he must make do with the school’s six-
year-old IBM 386 PC’s, that are little more then electric typewriters
compared with the multi-media machines he wishes the school could
afford . . . . A computer buff with distinctly better opportunities is
Michael Giardina, a sixth-grader at Harker, who uses the latest Apple
Power Macintosh at school to manage his own World Wide Web page.
He also surfs the Web for information on research topics like
deforestation, [and] sends his teachers E-mail with questions about
homework . . . .
39
As of 1995, over 50% of the U.S. work force occupied
information-based jobs.40  In fact, telecommunications and
information are the fastest growing sectors in the U.S.
economy.41  Unfortunately, public schools and libraries are
inadequately equipped to provide uniform access to the
Internet,42 an essential component to success in our global
economy.
A. PUBLIC SCHOOLS
President Clinton and the American Library Association
share the goal of connecting every public and school library to
39. Gary Andrew Poole, A New Gulf in American Education, the Digital
Divide, N.Y. Times, Jan. 29, 1996, at D3.
40. White Paper, supra note 2, at 10.
41. See id.
42. See supra note 2.
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the Internet by the year 2000.43  Executive Order 12,999
encourages the private sector to work with the federal
government to make modern technology a part of every
classroom.44  For public schools, this is an uphill battle.  In
1996, only 3% of the nation’s classrooms had Internet
connections.45  Malcolm Cohen, author of “Labor Shortages,”
notes that computer illiteracy will leave many children ill
prepared for the work force.46
As the introductory quote illustrates, children in more
affluent school districts have access to high technology both at
home and in school.47  Children in low-income areas often lack
any access to such resources.48  Leading educators stress the
significance of wide-area networking in schools serving the
disadvantaged and inner city populations:
In inner city schools, wide-area networking can particularly help
redress the burden of inequitable access to economic and cultural
resources that children there suffer . . . . New technologies are not
merely a good to distribute but a force to employ.  In concept,
networked multimedia can make the richest, most powerful resources
of our culture available to anyone, anywhere, at any time, and in
principle this change should have greatest relative value to those who
presently have least access to the fullness of our culture.  All children
will benefit, but the least advantaged children can benefit the most.
49
43. See, e.g., Library Bill of Rights, supra note 9 (ALA notes ethical
obligation to provide equal access of Internet technology); Technology Act of
1994, 20 U.S.C. §§ 6801-7005 (1994).  Following a White House initiative,
Congress passed the Act “to support a comprehensive system for the
acquisition and use . . . of technology and technology-enhanced curricula . . .
and administrative support resources and services to improve the delivery of
educational services.”  20 U.S.C. § 6812.  The purpose of this policy is “to
promote the use of technology in education, training, and lifelong learning,
including plans for the educational uses of a national information
infrastructure.”  Id. § 6831(c)(2)(A).
44. Exec. Order No. 12, 999, 61 Fed. Reg. 17, 277 (1996), reprinted in 40
U.S.C. § 484 (Supp. 1996).  See also Boddie et al., supra note 2, at 209 (noting
that Executive Order 12,999 also recommends “providing teachers with the
professional development they need to use new technologies effectively;
connecting classrooms to the [Internet]; and encouraging the creation of
excellent educational software”).
45. See Poole, supra note 39, at D3.
46. Id.
47. See supra text accompanying note 39.
48. The Wall Street Journal reported that only 41% of households in the
U.S. own a personal computer.  Only 1 in 7 of all households in the U.S. have
Internet access.  See generally Bertot et al., supra note 37.
49. Columbia University, Institute for Learning Technologies, Advanced
Media in Education Project, (visited Nov. 11, 1997) <http://www.ilt.columbia.
edu/ilt/docs/ILTame.html> (emphasis added).
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B. PUBLIC LIBRARIES
Our libraries fare far better than public schools with public
Internet access.  In 1997, 60% of public libraries offered public
Internet access, up from 28% in 1996.50Nonetheless, this access
is unevenly distributed.  One in three public library systems in
central city libraries supplied public Internet access, while less
than one in ten public library systems in rural areas offered
this access.51  The American Library Association (ALA) notes
that “while nearly three-fifths of the nation’s public library
systems offer some type of Internet access, fewer than one in
seven have World Wide Web access in their community branch
libraries.”52
Many individuals lack access to electronic information
because of their socio-economic condition.53  Their condition
limits them from the necessary infrastructure and technology
to take advantage of the Internet as a mode of expression.54
The ALA accepts the moral obligation of facilitating the
exercise of the right of “Freedom of Expression . . . and the
corollary right to receive information . . . regardless of format or
technology.”55  The ALA stresses that these rights extend to
50. See Bertot et al., supra note 37.  The 1997 survey provided
information on U.S. public library infrastructure and costs associated with
Internet related services and technology.  See id.  The study surveyed 2,000 of
the nation’s 8,921 public library systems and was weighted to represent public
libraries from diverse population service areas and central, city, suburban and
rural locations.  See id. See also, John Carlo Bertot, The 1996 National Survey
of Public Libraries and the Internet: Progress and Issues, (visited March 24,
2000) <http://istweb.syr.edu/~mcclure/nspl96/NSPL96_T.html> (noting that
disparities remain concerning public Internet access: “In comparing the
percent of public libraries that provide public access to the Internet from 1994-
1996, and projected to 1997, the growth rate is much smaller than the rate
that the libraries are obtaining Internet access for the library only. . . . Thus,
despite significant gains in overall connectivity, only 50% of the public
libraries are projected to be able to provide public access to the Internet by
March 1997.  The vast majority of the public libraries not providing public
access to the Internet serve populations of 99,000 or less”).
51. See generally Bertot, supra note 37.
52. See ALA Information Policy; 1997 National Suvey of U.S. Public
Libraries and the Internet (visited April 17, 2000) <http://www.ala.org/oitp/
survey97.html>.
53. See Library Bill of Rights, supra note 9.
54. See id.
55. Id. (stating that “[l]ibraries and librarians exist to facilitate the
exercise of these rights by selecting, producing, providing access to,
identifying, retrieving, organizing, providing instruction in the use of, and
preserving recorded expression regardless of the format or technology”).
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minors as well as adults, noting the importance of connecting
economically disadvantaged children to the Internet: “At-risk
children ages nine to fourteen participate in an Internet skills
project through the Hollins-Payson branch of the Enoch Pratt
Free Library in Baltimore, MD.  The ‘Whole New World’
program allows children to use electronic information and e-
mail to which they might not otherwise have access.”56  In fact,
the Library Bill of Rights states that “[i]t should be the goal of
all libraries to develop policies concerning access to electronic
resources in light of economic barriers to information access.”57
As expected, the largest impediment to providing uniform
access to the Internet is cost.  Approximately $500 million is
spent on information technology, of which $280 million is
allotted to Internet access alone.58  Public libraries frequently
go outside their operating budgets to obtain funding for
Internet access.59  This leaves little hope for rural and low-
income community branches that have difficulty obtaining
corporate and other sponsors.60
There is a ray of hope, however.  The federal government is
committed to alleviating telecommunications costs for public
schools and libraries to help ensure universal Internet access.
Section 254 of the 1996 Telecommunications Act directs the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to set up a
program funded by ISPs and telecommunications carriers to
subsidize telecommunications service to health care providers,
libraries, public schools, and low income and rural consumers.61
56. See Bertot et al., supra note 37 (quoting JoAnn G. Mondowney,
Licensed to Learn, SCH. LIBR. J. January 1996, at 32-34
57. See Library Bill of Rights, supra note 9.
58. See supra note 37.
59. Bertot et al., supra note 37 (noting that in 1997,  $70 million or nearly
25% of the $280 million for Internet access for public libraries was provided
from sources other than the library’s operating budget.  For example,
Libraries Online!, a Microsoft/ALA joint initiative, has given forty-one library
systems $10.5 million in financial and technical assistance and software.  Bill
and Melinda Gates also founded the Gates Library Foundation with a $200
million contribution that was matched by Microsoft).
60. See id. (noting lack of available federal and state funds as the second
largest hurdle for U.S. Public Libraries and the Internet).  The largest cost
hurdle is telecommunications costs, including phone line long distance charges
and leased line costs for data communications.  See id.
61. See 47 U.S.C. § 254(b) (West Supp. 1997).  There remains great
concern and debate over how the FCC should implement the section 254
Order.  A Federal-State Joint Board was convened to offer recommendations
regarding Universal Service.  On May 8, 1997 the FCC adopted many of the
Joint Board’s recommendations and issued its first of several Orders and
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Unfortunately, the FCC mandate narrowly focuses on
providing Universal Service in the telecommunications context
only.  Available funding is limited to subsidies for
telecommunications costs and excludes funding for copyright
and other intellectual property licensing fees.62
In 1997, the ALA listed digital copyright fees as one of the
five top factors affecting public library involvement in
providing Internet access.63  Today, the Copyright Act provides
little guidance for public libraries and schools concerning how
to minimize potential liability or licensing fees under the first
sale and/or fair use doctrines.
II. COPYRIGHT LAW INADEQUATELY ADDRESSES
DIGITAL TRANSMISSIONS
[L]aws and institutions must go hand and hand with the progress of
the human mind.  As that becomes more developed, more enlightened,
as new discoveries are made, new truths discovered . . . institutions
must advance also to keep pace with the times.
64
decisions.  The First Order clarified that only telecommunications carriers
must contribute to the Universal Fund, although some non-
telecommunications carriers may also provide some services (for example
Internet access and inside wiring services).  Today, it remains unresolved
whether ISPs fall within the definition of “telecommunications carriers” under
the Order.
On December 16, 1997 the FCC issued the “Third Universal Service
Order on Reconsideration,”  which included a budget breakdown for the first 6
months of 1998. “That Joint Board recommended, and this Commission
adopted, detailed rules to provide universal service support for low-income
consumers, for consumers in high-cost areas, and for schools, libraries, and
public and non-profit rural health care facilities.”  Commission Revises
Universal Service Collection Amounts For The First Six Months Of 1998 To
Better Correspond With Anticipated Demand, CC Docket No. 96-45 (December
16, 1997), available in 1997 WL 771033.
FCC Commissioner Harold Furchtgott-Roth dissented from the Third
Order; his concerns included questioning the large size of the funds for schools
and libraries.  See id.
62. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 254 (West Supp 1997); see also supra note 10 and
accompanying text.
63. Bertot et al., supra note 37.  These fees include licensing fees for
online databases and copyrighted material. The enumerated five factors in
rank order are: (1) Telecommunications fees; (2) availability of federal and
state funds; (3) hardware costs; (4) digital copyright fees and (5) availability of
in-house computer expertise.  Id.
64. White Paper, supra note 2, at 13 (quoting Inscription at the Jefferson
Memorial, Washington, D.C.).
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A. COPYRIGHT OVERVIEW
Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the Constitution gives
Congress the power “[t]o Promote the progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.”65  Clause 8 is the enabling provision for the
Copyright Act of 1976 (the Act) that protects certain types of
“original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of
expression.”66
Copyright pertains to the literary, musical, graphic or
artistic form in which the author expresses intellectual
concepts.67  Ideas, procedures, processes, systems, methods of
operation, concepts, principles or discoveries are not
copyrightable.68  The typical copyright term is the life of the
author plus 70 years.69  There is no statutory requirement for
an examination before a copyright can be secured; instead,
copyright is secured once the work is created and “fixed in any
tangible medium of expression.”70  Thus, the Act protects
original71 digital transmissions that are “fixed” in a “tangible
65. U.S.CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
66. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).  In drafting the 1976 Act, Congress made clear its
intent to leave “originality” undefined for purposes of the Act.  See H.R. REP.
NO. 94-1476, at 51 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5664  Instead,
“original works of authorship” was intended to incorporate without change the
standard of originality established by the courts under 1909 Act.  See id.
(“This standard does not include requirements of novelty, ingenuity, or
aesthetic merit, and there is no intention to enlarge the standard of copyright
protection to require them.”).
67. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (listing the following categories of “works of
authorship:” (1) literary works; (2) musical works, including any
accompanying words; (3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music;
(4) pantomimes and choreographic works; (5) pictorial, graphic or sculptural
works; (6) motion pictures and other audio-visual works; (7) sound recordings;
and (8) architectural works).
68. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (b).
69. See 17 U.S.C. § 302(a).
70. 17 U.S.C. § 102.  Federal registration does, however, create a public
record of the copyrighted work and gives the copyright owner certain statutory
advantages in an infringement action.  For example, registration within five
years of initial publication establishes prima facie evidence of the validity of
the copyright, as well as the facts stated on the copyright certificate.  See 17
U.S.C. § 410(c).
71. Originality requires independent creation and includes some degree of
“creativity,” which is less than the “novelty” requirement for patent law.  See,
e.g., L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 490 (2d Cir. 1976); Feist
Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991); see also
2000] JOHNNY CAN READ, BUT CAN HE "SURF"? 93
medium of expression.”
Originality is evaluated under a universal standard for
digital and printed works.  A work is original if it is a product
of independent creation; novelty is not required, but there must
be some modicum of creativity.72  However, what constitutes
“fixation” for digital transmissions is less clear.  The Act covers
fixation methods “now known or later developed, from which
they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated
either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.”73
Although the Act fails to address digital transmissions, its
legislative history indicates that digitization qualifies as
“fixation.”74  Thus, digital works fixed in material objects such
as floppy disks, compact discs (CD’s), CD-ROM’s, and other
digital storage devices qualify as “stable forms in which works
may be fixed and from which works may be perceived,
reproduced or communicated by means of a machine or
device.”75
Digital transmissions however, are “not fixed by virtue of
the transmission alone.”76  Live transmissions fail to meet the
fixation requirement unless the transmission is simultaneously
fixed to a “sufficiently permanent or stable [medium] to permit
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476 at 5664 (“The phrase ‘original works of authorship,’
which is purposefully left undefined, is intended to incorporate without change
the standard of originality established by the courts under the present
copyright statute.  This standard does not include requirements of novelty,
ingenuity, or esthetic merit, and there is no intention to enlarge the standard
of copyright protection to require them.”).
72. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340,
345-46 (1991) (stating that “[o]riginality is a constitutional requirement” and
that “[o]riginal, as the term is used in copyright, means only that the work
was independently created by the author (as opposed to copied from other
works), and that it possesses at least some minimal degree of creativity.”).
73. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1996).
74. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476 at 52 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N 5659, 5665-66 (defining fixations to include “words, numbers,
notes, sounds, pictures, or any other graphic or symbolic indicia, whether
embodied in a physical object in written, printed, photographic, sculptural,
punched, magnetic, or other stable form”).  As noted by the White Paper,
digitization “fits within the House Report’s list of permissible manners of
fixation” because a digitized work is “generally recorded (fixed) as a sequence
of binary digits (zeros and ones) using media specific encoding.”  White Paper,
supra note 2, at 26.
75. See White Paper, supra note 2, at 26 (citing Stern Electronics, Inc. v.
Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 855 (2d Cir. 1982)) (“[P]utting work in ‘memory
devices’ of a computer satisf[ies] the statutory requirement of a ‘copy’ in which
the work is ‘fixed.’”).
76. Id. at 27.
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it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a
period of more than transitory duration.”77  Although electronic
transmissions “‘transient’ in nature,” such as a quick screen
projection, or “captured momentarily in the ‘memory’ of a
computer” are not fixed,78 courts have determined that
electronic network transmissions from one computer to
another, residing in random access memory (RAM), are
sufficient fixations.79
Upon fulfilling the section 102 requirements,80 a copyright
owner has the following exclusive rights: (1) to reproduce the
copyright work in copies or phonorecords; (2) to prepare
derivative works based on the copyrighted work; (3) to
distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the
public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental,
77. Id. at 28 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 101).
78. Id. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 2222, 60TH CONG., 2D SESS, at 53, reprinted
in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N 5666-67).
79. See id. (citing Advanced Computer Services of Michigan Inc. v. MAI
Systems Corp., 845 F. Supp. 356, 363 (E.D. Va. 1994) (concluding that a
program stored only in RAM is sufficiently fixed, is confirmed, not refuted, by
the argument that it disappears from RAM the instant the computer is turned
off; if power remains on (and the work remains in RAM) for only seconds or
fractions of a second, the resulting RAM representation of the program
arguably would be too ephemeral to be considered “fixed”); Triad Systems Corp
v. Southeastern Express Co., 31 U.S.P.Q.2d 1239, 1243 (N.D. Cal. 1994)
(stating that “[c]opyright law is not so much concerned with the temporal
‘duration’ of a copy as it is with what the copy does, and what it is capable of
doing while it exists.  ‘Transitory’ duration is a relative term that must be
interpreted and applied in context.”)).
Commentators have challenged whether the courts and the White Paper
have reached a correct statutory interpretation in holding that digital copies
residing in RAM are “fixed.”
The [White Paper] endorses the conclusion of some relatively recent
cases where digital copies “fixed” only in RAM infringe the
reproduction right . . . notwithstanding language in the statute and
the legislative history indicating Congress intended to limit the scope
of the reproduction right to copies that were sufficiently permanent or
stable to permit the work to be perceived or reproduced for more than
a transitory duration. . . . Proponents of the view that RAM copies
infringe copyrights argue as long as the machine is on—and it can be
on indefinitely—a copy of the copyrighted work stored there can be
perceived or reproduced, thereby satisfying the “more than transitory
duration” standard.  (By this logic, holding a mirror up to a book
would be infringement because the book’s image could be perceived
there for more than a transitory duration, i.e., however long one has
the patience to hold the mirror.) . . . This is a questionable
interpretation of current law.
Samuelson, supra note 36, at 23.
80. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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lease, or lending; (4) to perform the copyrighted work publicly
in the case of literary, musical, dramatic and choreographic
works; and (5) to display the copyrighted work publicly.81
A copyright owner can only enforce her rights against one
who has “copied” her work; it is not an infringing act to
independently create a previously copyrighted work.82  For
Internet digital transmissions, an ISP must obtain permission
to transmit copyrighted information or face liability for
infringement.  The infringement may be direct, contributory, or
vicarious.83  For example, uploading protected information
without the copyright owner’s consent constitutes direct
infringement.84  Inducing others to download or consciously
permitting downloading of protected material may be
contributory or vicarious infringement.85
A critical issue for Internet transmissions is whether they
constitute “reproductions,”86 “distributions,”87 or both.  The
original electronic file is typically not erased when a copy is
transmitted.88  Because the original from which the copy is
generated remains intact, Internet communications arguably
infringe both reproduction and distribution rights.89  Indeed, for
bulletin board or website operators the query remains whether
downloading from a bulletin board or website is a
“reproduction” by the Internet user, or merely a “distribution”
by the operator.90
81. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1)-(5) (1996).
82. See 17 U.S.C. § 501.
83. See id.
84. See 17 U.S.C. § 501; see also Boddie et al., supra note 2, at 234, n.202
(citing Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. MAPHIA, 948  F. Supp. 923, 923-33 (N.D. Cal.
1996)).
85. Typically with vicarious infringement, the service provider or system
operator exercises control over the activities (such as a bulletin board) and
stands to directly profit from the infringing activity.  See Boddie et al., supra
note 2, at 234, n.203 (citing Playboy Enterprises, Inc.  v. Frena, 839 F. Supp.
1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (holding bulletin board operator directly liable for
infringement for subscribers uploading digital copies of Playboy magazine)).
Commentators correctly assert that the subscribers were the true “direct”
infringers, while the bulletin board service (BBS) vicariously infringed the
copyright owner’s exclusive right to publicly display and distribute its
photographs because the BBS did directly profit from this activity.
86. See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
87. See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
88. See White Paper, supra note 2, at 65-66.
89. Id. at 66-67; see also supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
90. See Boddie et al., supra note 2, at 226.
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B. THE FAIR USE LIMITATION AND LIBRARY EXEMPTION
At first blush, copyright protection appears to upset the
constitutionally mandated balance between individualism and
public dissemination of information.  It grants long-term
exclusive rights in creative expression, without a substantive
examination process91 to evaluate whether the creator has
“earned” these rights under the statute.  Nevertheless, the
trade-off for the longer term92 is a narrowly defined set of
exclusive rights, followed by a series of limitations such as fair
use93 and first sale.94  These limits set property boundaries that
take into account the public’s interest in the free dissemination
of information.95  Also, because others can still use the ideas or
factual information contained in the copyrighted work, there is
no stifling of further creative effort during the copyright term.96
Fair use is a long-standing judicial doctrine codified in the
1976 Act: “[R]eproduction in copies or phonorecords . . . for
purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching
(including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or
research, is not an infringement of copyright.”97  The four
factors evaluated to determine fair use include (1) the purpose
and character of the use including whether the use is
91. Unlike copyrights, to obtain patent or trademark protection an
applicant goes through a substantive application and examination process in
the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO).  Compare 17 U.S.C. § 408-410 with
15 U.S.C. §§ 111, 131.  The PTO evaluates whether the relevant statutory
patent or trademark requirements have been met.  See 37 CFR 53132
(outlining the rules for Patent and Examination procedure).
92. Contrast this time period with that provided under patent rights,
which provides only 20 years of an exclusive “right to exclude others from
making, using[,] . . . or selling the [claimed] invention.”  See 35 U.S.C. §
154(a)(1) (1996).  Consequently, the object of the patent is placed in the public
domain much earlier than the copyrighted work.
93. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1996); see also supra note II.B.
94. See 17 U.S.C. § 109 (1996); see also supra note II.C.
95. See e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471
U.S. 539 (1985); see also Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service
Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349-50 (1991) (opining that the idea/expression dichotomy
“assures authors the right to their original expression, but encourages others
to build freely upon the ideas and information conveyed by a work.”  The Feist
court further states that although it “may seem unfair that much of the fruit
of the [author’s ] labor may be used by others without compensation, [it is] a
constitutional requirement, [and] the means by which copyright advances the
progress of science and art.”).
96. See id.
97. See 17 U.S.C. § 107.
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commercial; (2) the nature of the work; (3) the amount and
substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted
work as a whole; and (4) the use’s market effect.98  The
legislative history notes that fair use is evaluated on a case-by-
case basis with no single factor being dispositive of fair use.99
For non-profit schools, the Act’s legislative history includes
educational “Guidelines”100 for determining when copying and
distributing printed material qualifies as fair use.101 According
to the Guidelines, spontaneous copying for education purposes
is fair use, while “copying [cannot] be used to create or to
replace or substitute for anthologies, compilations[,] or
collective works.”102
For public libraries, section 108 of the Act outlines
instances where they can make and distribute non-infringing
single copies of copyrighted works.103  It absolves libraries from
liability as long as notice is provided and the copying is (1) to
preserve and secure unpublished works;104 (2) to replace a copy
that is damaged, deteriorating, lost, or stolen;105 (3) to
reproduce a portion for patrons for private study, scholarship,
or research;106 and (4) to reproduce an entire work for patrons
for private study, scholarship, or research.107  The library must
98. See id.
99. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5659, 5679.
100. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 68 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5681 (hereinafter GUIDELINES).  The Guidelines were
actually drafted by various interested parties such as publishers and
educators, and incorporated by the House because they were deemed to
contain “a reasonable interpretation of the minimum standards of fair use.”
Id.
101. See generally Princeton University Press v. Michigan Document
Services, Inc., 855 F. Supp. 905 (E.D. Mich. 1994) (discussing for profit versus
not for profit copying); Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko’s Graphics Corp., 758 F.
Supp. 1522 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding that for profit copying of educational
materials are not excused under fair use).
102. GUIDELINES, supra note 100, at §§ I, III(A).  Because the Educational
Guidelines are not codified, courts disagree on the weight of their applicability
in the fair use analysis.  See, e.g., cases cited supra note 101.
103. 17 U.S.C. § 108.  Section 117(h) excludes musical, pictorial, graphic or
sculptural works, motion pictures and other AV works from the library’s
limited right of reproduction.
104. 17 U.S.C. § 108(b) 1996.
105. 17 U.S.C. § 108(c) (“The right . . . applies . . . [if] an unused
replacement cannot be obtained at a fair price.”).
106. 17 U.S.C. § 108(d).
107. 17 U.S.C. § 108(e).
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be open to the public, can make only a single copy, and cannot
reap direct or indirect commercial advantage.108  Section 108(f)
bridges the gap between fair use and reproduction by libraries:
“[N]othing in this section in any way affects the right of fair use
as provided by section 107.”109
C. THE “FIRST SALE” LIMITATION
Libraries traditionally operated under the first sale
doctrine.110  Section 106(3) outlines the copyright owner’s
exclusive right of distribution, while section 109(a) limits the
distribution right once the copyrighted work is sold.111  The first
sale limitation applies exclusively to the distribution right.112
Thus, one is not free to copy or create derivative works from the
copyrighted work and libraries must look to other limitations
such as fair use for guidance in this area.113  First sale becomes
problematic for Internet Communications if one views digital
transmissions as triggering both the distribution and
reproduction right.114  Because first sale limits the distribution
right only, public libraries may still face liability for
reproduction of digital transmissions when providing access to
the Internet.
The fair use and first sale limitations allow libraries and
public schools to provide uniform access to printed material for
108. 17 U.S.C. § 108.
109. 17 U.S.C. §108 (f).  This section also notes that contractual obligations
supercede the section 108 right to copy or distribute a single copy.  See id.
Thus, section 108 does not absolve libraries from liability for making copies in
violation of a shrink-wrap license that may accompany software or other
digital works.  See id.  This contractual limitation is not, however, present
under section 107’s fair use provisions.
110. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(3) (1996), 109(a) (1996); see also supra II.C.
(discussing first sale).
111. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (“Notwithstanding the provisions of section
106(3), the owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this
title, or any person authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the
authority of the copyright owner to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession
of the [copyrighted work].”).
112. See, e.g., Mirage Editions, Inc. v. Albuquerque A.R.T. Co., 856 F.2d
1341, 1344 (9th Cir. 1988).  Libraries look to section 108 for reproduction
limitations, and section 117(h) which excludes musical, pictorial, graphic or
sculptural works, motion pictures, and other audiovisual works from libraries’
limited right to reproduce.
113. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 108, 117(h)
114. See discussion supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
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educational and research purposes.115  Unfortunately, the Act
fails to clarify that these provisions apply to digital
transmissions. Because original,  “fixed” digital transmissions
fall within the Copyright Act’s subject matter,116 the fair use
and first sale limitations should equally apply to both printed
and digital transmissions.117  Nonetheless, the Clinton
Administration’s Working Group on Intellectual Property views
matters differently.
III. THE “WHITE PAPER” RECOMMENDATIONS DISRUPT
THE BALANCE BETWEEN THE PROPERTY RIGHTS
OF COPYRIGHT OWNERS AND THE
DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION TO THE
PUBLIC
The emergence of integrated information technology is dramatically
changing, and will continue to change, how people and businesses
deal in and with information . . . how works are created, reproduced,
distributed, adapted, displayed, performed, owned licensed. . . . This
leads, understandably, to a call for adaptation of—or change in—the
law.
118
Some participants have suggested that the United States is being
divided into a nation of information “haves” and “have-nots” and that
this could be ameliorated by ensuring that the fair use defense is
broadly generous in the [Internet] context.  The Working Group
rejects the notion that copyright owners should be taxed—apart from
all others—to facilitate the legitimate goal of “universal access.”
119
115. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 108 (library reproduction limitations) and 17
U.S.C. § 109 (First sale).
116. See discussion supra note 25 and accompanying text.
117. Today, electronic works owned or purchased by libraries, e.g., CD
ROM games or other programs, could be used at library facilities and viewed
as “home uses.”  As such, a single copy can be used by a library patron, so long
as no more than one copy of program is used simultaneously.  See 17 U.S.C. §§
109(c), 117(1).  If a library wants more than one active copy of an electronic
work, the library can arrange for a software “site license,” which allows use of
more than one active copy at once, or the library can pay a royalty fee for
multiple uses via the copyright Clearance Center.  See Bertot supra note 37.
Digital transmissions from the Internet raise unique issues because they are
not “electronic works” like a CD ROM or electronic book purchased by the
library, but various types of copyrightable and uncopyrightable information
being disseminated over a global network.
118. White Paper, supra note 2, at 12.
119. Id. at 84.
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In 1993, President Clinton formed the Working Group on
Intellectual Property to evaluate whether rapidly evolving
electronic technology mandated a change and/or clarification of
intellectual property laws.120  In September 1995, the Group
published its White Paper, or final report containing analysis
of, and recommendations for, changing intellectual property
law as it relates to the Internet.121 The key provisions of the
White Paper recommend amending the Act to: (1) clarify that
digital transmissions fall within the exclusive distribution right
of the copyright owner;122 (2) expand the definition of “transmit”
in section 101 to include transmissions of reproductions;123 and
(3) clarify that digital transmission of copyrighted work into the
United States violates the copyright owner’s exclusive
importation rights.124  In addition, the recommendations abolish
the applicability of the first sale limitation to Internet
transmissions because digital transmissions become both
“reproductions” and “distributions.”125
The introductory quotes epitomize the paradox of the
White Paper.  The White Paper acknowledges that changes in
technology drive changes in intellectual property law; yet it
gives minimal attention to the constitutionally mandated
balance between rewarding copyright owners as an incentive to
“create” and fostering dissemination of all forms of information
to the public.126  The White Paper broadly outlines how section
106 exclusive rights granted to a copyrighted owner apply
equally to printed material and digital transmissions, while
narrowly analyzing the applicability of the fair use and first
sale limitations to Internet transmissions.127
The White Paper states that  “because of the nature of
computer-to-computer communications,” most Internet
transactions will implicate “the fundamental right to reproduce
120. See White Paper, supra note 2, at 1.  The Group was chaired by Bruce
Lehman, former Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks.  See id. at 2.
121. See supra note 2.
122. See id. at 213.
123. See id. at 217.
124. See id. at 221.
125. As noted previously, first sale only protects future distribution, not
copying.  See 17 U.S.C. § 109.
126. See supra note 123.
127. White Paper, supra note 2, at 63-72; see also Samuelson, supra note
36 (arguing that White Paper’s recommendations effectively abolish the first
sale rule for digital transmissions and presents a “highly constrictive view of
the fair use doctrine”).
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copyrighted works.”128  Similarly, considerable time is spent
analyzing how uploading and downloading digital information
also constitutes “distribution.”129  The White Paper strongly
advocates amending the 1976 Act to clarify that Internet
transmissions trigger both the rights of reproduction and
distribution.130  In sharp contrast, the White Paper evaluates
how “fair use” applies to Internet activity, but conservatively
applies current law.  For example, it narrowly interprets the
courts’ balancing of the section 107 factors131 to determine
whether a particular use is fair.132
First, in evaluating the use’s purpose and character,133 the
White Paper clings to the Sony Corp. of America v. Universal
City Studios, Inc.134 presumption that all commercial non-
transformative uses are unfair, despite the broader
interpretation that this presumption has been limited, if not
128. White Paper, supra note 2, at 64-66.
For example, when a computer user accesses a document resident on
another computer, the image on the user’s screen exists—under
contemporary technology—only by virtue of the copy that is
reproduced in the user’s computer memory.  It has long been clear
under U.S. law that the placement of copyrighted material into a
computer’s memory is a reproduction of that material (because the
work in memory then may be, in the law’s terms, “perceived,
reproduced, or . . . communicated. . .with the aid of a machine or
device”).
Id. at 64-65.
129. See id. at 67-69.
130. White Paper, supra note 2, at 67-69, 213-17.  Specifically section 101
would be amended to include “transmission” in the definition of publication
and to add the following: “To ‘transmit’ a reproduction is to distribute it by any
device or process whereby a copy or phonorecord of the work is fixed beyond
the place from which it was sent.” Id. at Appendix 1.  Similarly, section 106(3)
would then read “to distribute copies of phonorecords of the copyrighted work
to the public by sale or other lending, or by transmission.” Id.
131. See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
132. See White Paper, supra note 2, at 73-84.
133. See 17 U.S.C. § 107.
134. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).  In Sony, the defendants sued Sony Corporation
alleging contributory infringement for selling Betamax tapes that enabled
home taping of various television programs.  See id. at 417.  As part of its
finding that home taping constitutes “fair use” as a non-profit socially
beneficial activity, the Court noted that “[i]f the Betamax were used to make
copies for a commercial or profit-making purpose, such use would
presumptively be unfair.”  Id. at 449.  This statement has been interpreted by
some courts as creating the ultimate presumption that any commercial use is
unfair.  See, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471
U.S. 539 (1985); Financial Information, Inc. v. Moody’s Investors Service, Inc.,
751 F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 1984); Haberman v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 626 F.
Supp. 201 (D. Mass. 1986).
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overruled, by Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music Inc.135
In Campbell, the defendants argued that 2 Live Crew’s rap
parody “Pretty Woman” infringed Roy Orbison’s song “Oh
Pretty Woman” and was not a fair use.136  In reversing the
lower court’s finding of unfair use, the Supreme Court criticizes
confining the analysis of the first fair use factor to “commercial
use” by inflating “a presumption which is ostensibly culled from
Sony.”137  It then opines that “the language of the statute makes
clear that the commercial or nonprofit educational purpose of a
work is only one element of the first factor inquiry into its
purpose and character.”138  Arguably, this statement alone
overrules the presumption that the first factor turns on
commercial versus non-profit use.
Nonetheless, the White Paper attempts to distinguish
Campbell by arguing that the Sony presumption survives as it
applies to “non-transformative” uses.139  It notes the
presumption’s inapplicability in cases involving
“transformative use,”140 as opposed to “mere reproduction.”141
Ironically, nothing in Campbell supports this distinction,
particularly in light of the express statements limiting the
presumption.142
The White Paper goes on to limit fair use for libraries and
public schools by stating  that “mere reproductions have fared
rather badly in court . . . even in [the] educational context.”143
It fails however, to distinguish that most educational copying
135. 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
136. See id. at 573-574.
137. Id. at 584.
138. Id.
139. White Paper, supra note 2, at 76.
140. Id.  A transformative use occurs when the alleged infringer has taken
the copyrighted work and “transformed” it into another medium.  For example,
in Campbell, 2 Live Crew had taken the popular song “Pretty Woman” and
transformed it into a “rap parody.”  Campbell, 510 U.S. at 572.
141. White Paper, supra note 2, at 76-77.
142. See, e.g., Campbell, 510 U.S. at 451; see also Samuelson, supra note 36
(noting that the White Paper “neglects to mention that this second Sony
presumption was repudiated by the Supreme Court this spring in Campbell v.
Acuff Rose”) and 17 U.S.C. § 107 (the goal of the limitation is to promote
scholarship, research and social and political criticism).
143. White Paper, supra note 2, at 77.  The drafters cite Marcus v. Rowley,
695 F.2d 1171 (9th Cir. 1983), Encyclopaedia Britannica Educational Corp. v.
Crooks, 558 F. Supp. 1247 (W.D.N.Y. 1983), and Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko’s
Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), to support their
proposition.
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will pass the fair use analysis if made within the Guidelines
and for non-profit purposes.144
The White Paper adopts a similarly narrow interpretation
of how courts might evaluate the nature of the copyrighted
work; it posits, without legal or statutory support, that courts
might consider whether digital transmissions should be treated
differently from printed material by evaluating the nature of
the copyrighted work.145  In fact, the White Paper merely states
that courts weigh copying of fiction and unpublished works in
the copyright owner’s favor, while weighing factual and
published works in the defendant’s favor.146  Thus, no legal
basis exists for predicting that future courts will weigh digital
copying differently from printed copying when evaluating fair
use.
Finally, the White Paper concludes its fair use analysis by
stating that courts should approach fair use in the Internet
context just as they do “traditional” environments.147  The
White Paper then argues that technological means of tracking
transactions and licensing will reduce the application and scope
of the fair use doctrine in all settings.148  This statement
144. For a discussion of the Guidelines, see supra notes 100-102 and
accompanying text.  Of the cases cited by the drafters, supra note 143, only
Basic Books involved a defendant who stood to profit from the alleged
infringement, and there are a host of other educational settings within the
Guidelines where “mere reproduction” qualifies as fair use.
145. White Paper, supra note 2, at 78.  Arguably, the drafters’ bias is
reflected in their express reference to printed works as “conventional print or
other analog form.” Id.  In the 1980’s and 1990’s, one can hardly view digital
transmissions as “non-conventional.”  By 1995, Internet activity was certainly
approaching a “conventional” means of communication considering the
numerous chat-group, bulletin board, and other such activities taken
advantage of by the public.
146. Id.  Note that in the next few pages, the White Paper narrowly
predicts that “[c]ommercial uses that involve no ‘transformation’ by users and
harm actual or potential markets will likely always be infringing, while non-
profit educational transformative uses will likely often be fair.  Between these
extremes, courts will have to engage in the same type of fact-intensive
analysis that typifies fair use litigation and frustrates those who seek bright
lines clearly separating the lawful from the unlawful.” (emphasis added).  Id.
at 80.
147. Id. at 80. See also Texaco at 918.
148. Id. at 82.  In support of its theory, the White Paper cites American
Geophysical Union v. Texaco, 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1995), in which the court
stressed the availability of licensing through the Copyright Clearance Center
as weighing against multiple copying of magazines by commercial enterprises
for research and commercial purposes.  American Geophysical does not apply
to public schools and libraries, however, because they are non-profit
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completely ignores the mandate of section 107 to advocate
certain unencumbered uses of copyrighted material for
purposes of promoting scholarship and research.  It reflects the
White Paper’s failure to effectively balance between the
competing interests of protecting copyright property and of
furthering education through the free dissemination of
information.
The White Paper is not completely insensitive to the
constitutionally mandated balance for copyright.  It promotes
expanding the section 108 library exemption149 to expressly
include digital works and advocates exemptions for the visually
impaired.150  Here, it notes that “nowhere is this balancing
[between copyright owners and legitimate needs of users] more
apparent than in the exemptions that are intended to permit
libraries reasonable use of copyrighted works to serve the
legitimate demands of their patrons.”151
The White Paper’s paradox and true inability to effectuate
the requisite balance is revealed, however, when it repudiates a
broad application of fair use for Internet transmissions and
ignores the effect of abolishing first sale on libraries: “The
Working Group rejects the notion that copyright owners should
be taxed—apart from all others—to facilitate the legitimate
goal of ‘universal access’ [to the Internet].”152  Providing
universal Internet access embraces the heart of Congress’ goal
to promote the progress of science and the useful arts.153  The
White Paper’s biggest deficiency is its failure to acknowledge
the crucial role of balancing the copyright owner’s rights
against legitimate needs of users to access all forms of
information, including digital.154  This deficiency continues in
institutions devoted to educating the general public.
149. See supra notes 103-109 and accompanying text.
150. White Paper, supra note 2, at 225-26, A-1, at 3.
151. Id. at 225.  It is ironic that the White Paper does not use such
language in its discussion of fair use or first sale, which are also cornerstone
doctrines that ensure the balance and survival of libraries and public schools.
152. Id. at 84.  Arguably, the White Paper’s refusal to acknowledge the
balance in its first sale evaluation stems from its recommendations’ failure to
account for the abolition of first sale under the proposed amendment.  It also
fails to consider or discuss the balance or even mention the tragic effect of
eliminating the balance for public libraries in its legal discussion of first sale.
See, e.g., id. at 90-95 (discussing first sale).
153. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
154. See, e.g., Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499
U.S. 340, 349 (1991) ( “The primary objective of copyright is not to reward the
labor of authors, but ‘to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.’”).
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the new Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA).155
Although the DMCA resolves key issues of ISP liability and the
circumvention of technological protection measures, it
completely sidesteps the first sale issue and gives only general
references to fair use.
IV. CONGRESS SHOULD EXPRESSLY EXTEND THE FAIR
USE AND FIRST SALE DOCTRINES TO ELECTRONIC
TRANSMISSIONS PROVIDED BY PUBLIC SCHOOLS AND
LIBRARIES
But what about those not so fortunate?  What of that portion of the
Interestingly, several organizations and individuals reminded the
Working Group that its recommendations must include careful attention to
the constitutionally mandated balance.  See, e.g., Institute for Learning
Technologies Teachers College, ILT Comments on the Preliminary Report of
the IITF Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights, (visited Jan. 31, 2000)
<http://www.ilt.columbia.edu/text_version/projects/copyright/
papers/iltdocs/ILTWGIP.html> (“It is important for the final report to extend
the public policy in favor of the free dissemination of ideas, which is grounded
in both the First Amendment and the intellectual property clause of the
Constitution, in relation to the [Internet]. . . .  History has shown that each
new major communications technology requires a reinterpretation of existing
law in order to determine ways in which the basic Constitutional objectives
can be reinforced.  Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that the final Working
Group report will relate its recommendations for changes in the copyright law
to these Constitutional Goals.”) Statement of Robert L. Oakley on Behalf of
Several Library and Education Associations before the Working Group on
Intellectual Property of the Information Policy Committee of the National
Information Infrastructure Task Force (visited Jan. 31, 2000)
<http://www.ilt.columbia.edu/text_version/projects/copyright/
papers/oakley2.html> (noting that Librarians and educators have no desire to
deprive authors of a reasonable economic benefit for their work, but licensing
proposals should also accommodate fair use and library use, as authorized in
the act, and stating that “[t]he Copyright Act represents a careful balance
between the rights of creators and the rights of users. . . . This means that . . .
the rights of copyright owners should be broad enough to provide a fair return
on their work, but limited in the public interest so as not to inhibit the use of
existing works, especially for research, education, and the creation of new
knowledge”) Testimony of Joseph M. Cosgrove, Esq. Before The Public Hearing
On Intellectual Property Issues Involved In The National Information
Infrastructure Initiative, (visited April 13, 2000)
<http://www.ilt.columbia.edu/text_version/projects/copyright/
papers/hearing.html> (“Contrary to the customary view, the patent and
copyright power which the Constitution bestows upon Congress is concerned
not primarily with the interest of the artist, author, or creator, but instead
protects a broader public right to receive information and ideas. . . . This right
to access information has been supported by the Supreme Court at least in the
First Amendment context.” ).
155. Pub.L. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860.
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public for which the expensive technology necessary to gain a spot on
the NII is beyond their reach. . . .Shall they be relegated to a lower
level of national dialogue and thus lose the opportunity to fully
participate in the intellectual activity of our nation?
I suggest to you that while this segment may lack possession of
certain technological tools, it possesses something far more
important, and that is a constitutional entitlement to be part of any
informational feast which government may assist in creating.
156
The nation’s libraries and public schools carry out society’s
moral and ethical obligation to educate children.157  Broadening
existing copyright law to favor copyright owners effectively
neutralizes the ability of these institutions to provide equal
access of digital information to the economically disadvantaged.
This upsets the constitutionally mandated balance between
protecting the “property” rights of copyright owners and the
dissemination of information to the public.158
A. COPYRIGHTS ARE PROPERTY
Interestingly, scholars disagree on whether copyrightable
“information” is properly defined as “property.”159  To fit the
common law property paradigm a law must consider “moral
interests” in addition to wealth or efficiency interests.160
156. See Cosgrove, supra note 154.  Mr. Cosgrove, a self-proclaimed civil
libertarian, further opines that “this constitutional interpretation will most
certainly test the validity of any [Internet] legislation which fails to include all
segments of society in its attempt to develop the information superhighway.”
157. See, e.g., Library Bill of Rights, supra note 9; see also Digital Future
Coalition, (visited Jan. 31, 2000) <http://www.dfc.org/>.  The Digital Future
Coalition (a collaboration of 39 of the nation’s leading non-profit educational
scholarly, library, and consumer groups “committed to striking an appropriate
balance in law and public policy between protecting intellectual property and
affording public access to it”).
158. See Cosgrove, supra note 154.
159. Compare Wendy J. Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright:
The Challenges of Consistency, Consent, and Encouragement, 41 STAN. L. REV.
1343 (1989) (arguing that copyright should be viewed as having the same
components as tangible property), with Timothy J. Brennan, Copyright,
Property and the Right to Deny, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 675 (1993) (supporting
copyright as property, Brennan takes a conceptually different approach from
Gordon by looking at the restrictions placed on tangible property and finding
them similar to restrictions placed on copyright.  Thus, Brennan argues,
enabling copyright to qualify as “property”).
Brennan correctly asserts that the restrictions surrounding copyrights
help make the case for it qualifying as “property” in a legal sense.  Real
property carries numerous restrictions such as zoning, which serve to benefit
society culturally, socially, and economically.  See Brennan at 696.
160. See id. at 682 (explaining that real property rights were developed in a
2000] JOHNNY CAN READ, BUT CAN HE "SURF"? 107
According to Ronald Dworkin, the additional protection of
moral rights distinguishes common law from statutory law.161
Common law property includes evaluating fundamental or
natural rights.  As a legislative enactment, copyright law lacks
the “moral status” to gain the attributes of common law
property.162  Other commentators state that a copyright owner’s
lack of control over copyrighted information negates any
property paradigm.163  They argue that fair use and other
restrictions on copyright owners exclusive rights prevent them
from exercising true control.164  Because the “right to control” is
the sine que non of property, copyrighted information fails to
qualify.165
Recent commentators distinguish however, that
“restrictions” such as fair use and first sale are acceptable
limitations that exist to balance rewarding creators against
society’s moral interests.166  They note that real property is
replete with limitations such as zoning laws, which serve to
balance the owner’s right to exclude, against society’s moral
interest in having environmentally and economically-balanced
communities.167  As such, copyrights are properly categorized as
intellectual “property.”168
common law regime that focuses on natural and fundamental rights rather
than wealth distribution and efficiency).
161. Brennan, supra note 159, at 683 (citing RONALD DWORWIN, TAKING
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 82-84 (1977) ).
162. Id.
163. See e.g.,  Douglas Y’barbo, The Heart of the Matter: The Property Right
Conferred by Copyright, 49 MERCER L. REV. 643 (1998) (arguing that ethereal
nature of copyright and its numerous restrictions prevent it from qualifying as
property, particularly because the “limitations” prevent true control by
copyright owners.  Y’Barbo distinguishes copyright from patents which,
though ethereal, qualify as “property” due to the patentee’s true exclusive
right to “make, use and sell”).
164. Id.
165. Id. at 645.
166. See Brennan, supra note 159.
167. Id at 688-93 (outlining Ronald Dworkin’s jurisprudential views which
distinguish statutory from common law).  Dworkin argues that the legislature
dwells on wealth distribution and efficiency claims, while the judiciary in
creating common law includes evaluating “moral interests” which may exist
apart from the wealth and efficiency.  Brennan argues that despite being
“statutory,” copyright laws’ limitations such as fair use, and first sale which
consider “moral interests” of fostering education are exactly what enable
copyrights to fit the “property” paradigm.  Brennan therefore asserts that
copyrights qualify as property under both a Lockean and Coasean analysis by
virtue of their limitations that serve the “public good.”  Id. at 709-14.
168. See id. at 712.
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By definition, property is merely a right to exclude.169  It is
“a legally enforceable power to exclude others from using a
resource, without need to contract with them.”170  The series of
section 106 exclusive rights contained in the Copyright Act of
1976171 enables copyrighted material to qualify as “property,”
particularly because these rights are both assignable and
transferable.172
Moreover, like patents and trademarks, copyrights
squarely fit within the Posnerian property paradigm.  They
include both the static benefit of preventing overuse of the
resource and the dynamic benefit of providing an incentive to
create or improve upon existing resources.173  The exclusive
rights and lengthy term of protection174 provide a reward and
incentive to create copyrightable information.  The
“boundaries” which prevent overuse of the resource include: (1)
copyrights’ fixation and demarcation requirements; (2) section
102’s limited definition of copyrightable subject matter; and (3)
the limited set of exclusive rights provided in section 106.175
Moreover, the Act’s various limitations such as fair use and
first sale further define moral “boundaries” which ensure
society’s need for the free dissemination of information for
education and research.
Although a network of property laws provide incentives to
create and acquire real and intangible property, limitations and
restrictions on these rights are necessary and essential to
economic, cultural, and social development.176  For example,
169. See, e.g., JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES KRIER, PROPERTY 58 (3d ed.
1993).
170. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An
Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 266 (1987).
171. See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
172. Gordon, supra note 159, at 1364.  In mapping out the components of
entitlement structures in tangible property, Gordon emphasizes three rights
which an owner of tangible property has: (1) the right to exclude others; (2)
power of transfer; and (3) privilege of use.  Id at 1378.  She looks to the rights
created by section 106 as giving owners of copyrights similar rights as are
given owners of tangible property. See id. at 1366.  Because the rights granted
by section 106 are “exclusive rights,” the copyright owner is given the rights of
exclusion. Id.  The words “to authorize” in section 106 give the power to
transfer, while the words “to do” give the privilege of use.  Id.
173. See generally Landes & Posner, supra note 170.
174. The statutory term of protection is presently the life of the author plus
70 years, or the earlier of 95 years from the year of its first publication or 120
years from the year of its creation.  See 17 U.S.C. § 302 (1999 Supp.).
175. See Gordon, supra note 159, at 1380-84.
176. See id. at 1361-64; see also Brennan, supra note 159, at 688 n.47.
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zoning laws limiting the exclusive rights of real property
owners foster community development, economic growth, and a
balanced environment.177  Similarly, uniform commercial laws
limit the use and control of personal property to ensure uniform
and balanced economic growth.178
B. FAIR USE AND FIRST SALE MUST LIBERALLY APPLY TO
INTERNET TRANSMISSIONS TO MEET THE
CONSTITUTIONALLY MANDATED BALANCE PROTECTING
COPYRIGHT “PROPERTY” AND “PROMOTING PROGRESS OF
SCIENCE AND THE USEFUL ARTS.”179
Fair use, first sale, and other copyright limitations foster
cultural growth180 and economic development by providing
means for educational institutions to provide uniform access to
information. Because copyright includes balancing moral
interests, it possesses the attributes of common law property
and must be evaluated as such.181  Thus, in difficult cases, such
as providing uniform access to the Internet, Congress must
consider the “moral rights” at stake, rather than limiting its
decisions to efficiency and wealth distribution.182
Furthermore, as noted in the introductory quote,183 the
economically disadvantaged have the constitutional right to be
177. See, e.g., Brennan, supra note 159, at 697 (analogizing real property
limitations to copyright limitations and noting that examples like zoning laws,
show that “property can be modified in copyright-like ways without requiring
that the objects in question be regarded as something other than property”).
178. Id.
179. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  Under Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the
U.S. Constitution, copyrightable subject matter is “Science,” while patentable
subject matter is the “useful Arts.”  See CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT
LAW 17 n.64 (1998).
180. See Brennan, supra note 159, at 688-89.  Brennan notes:
Copyrighted works—literature, music, films, graphic arts—are, with
political, ethnic and religious institutions, the defining components of
a culture.  Treating these as property essentially means that these
defining components, and our culture as a whole, can be owned with
the perquisites of buying, selling and excluding. . . .  Copyright law
reflects these concerns to only a small degree, through the limited
“fair use” exemption for educational uses.
181. Id. at 713-714
182. By refusing to broadly evaluate fair use in the Internet context to
uniform dissemination of information because it would unduly tax copyright,
the White Paper ignores its own legislative mandate to place the moral
interest paramount to the wealth distribution or efficiency interest.
183. See supra text accompanying note 156.
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part of the progress of science and the useful arts.184  Nothing in
the Constitution sets economic boundaries limiting this
“[p]rogress” to the economically advantaged.  Indeed, the next
Charles Drew or Bill Gates may presently sit in a classroom in
a low-income school district that lacks the resources to access
high technology information.  True progress of science and the
useful arts is hindered if these students are not exposed to
“global” digital knowledge via the Internet.185
The Internet carried over 540 billion packets of information
in 1993.186  By, 1999, over 200 million people were expected to
gain Internet access.187  Because the federal government heavily
funds the Internet,188 any law creating economic barriers to
uniform Internet access arguably restrains the fundamental
right of “Free Speech.”189  Copyright law can reward authors
184. Others argue that Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8 is not the only
constitutional mandate for uniform information access.
185. Furthermore, because several layers of information can be nested via
“hypertext” links on the Internet, individuals unable to access the Internet
lack the opportunity to become effective and efficient scholars and researchers.
186. Boddie, supra note 2, at 196 (citing 11 COMPUTER LAW 2 (July 1994)).
187. Id. at 194 (citing ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 823 (E.D. Pa.
1996), aff’d 117 U.S. 2329 (1997)).
188. The Internet grew out of a network developed by Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency (DARPA). See id. at 195.  DARPA developed much of
the protocols for sending and receiving information as more networks were
added. See id.  The DARPA Internet, which linked defense contractors and
university laboratories for defense research ultimately grew into the
“Internet,” which today consists of  “a confederation of national, regional and
local networks running under a standard set of protocols referred to as the
Internet Protocols.”  Id. at 195-96.  Five federal agencies presently fund the
Internet along with various universities, states, and private companies.  Id. at
196.
189. Many forms of speech, including political, are transmitted via the
Internet.  Thus, the government’s role in pricing certain citizens out of this
forum and preventing them from having uniform access to give and respond to
electronic political speech raises First Amendment concerns.  Unfortunately,
the Internet is also heavily funded by private entities, thereby making it
primarily “private property.” See id.  While it is clear that citizens have a
constitutional guarantee of free speech, “it is a guarantee against abridgment
by government, federal or state,” not private corporations or persons.
Hudgens v. NLRB., 424 U.S. 507, 511 (1976).  Thus, the more “private” the
Internet, the weaker the First Amendment argument.
There are, however, Supreme Court cases opining that even private
property is not the “absolute dominion of the owner. The more an owner for his
[or her] advantage, opens up his [or her] property for use by the public in
general, the more do his [or her] rights become circumscribed by the statutory
and constitutional rights of those who use it.”  Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S.
501, 506 (1946); See also id. at 507 (stating that “the public . . .has an identical
interest in the functioning of the community in such manner that the channels
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with certain exclusive rights to information placed on the
Internet, but cannot enforce these rights to the exclusion of
equal access.  The Web facilitates global communication.
Global communication in turn enhances global knowledge.
Having a broad base of technological expertise strengthens the
United States both socially and economically.  Thus, to remain
true to the Constitution, intellectual property law must
of communication remain free”); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1,
20 (1945) (“That [the First] Amendment rests on the assumption that the
widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic
sources is essential to the welfare of the public, that a free press is condition of
a free society.  Surely a command that the government itself shall not impede
that free flow of ideas does not afford non-governmental combinations a refuge
if they impose restraints upon that constitutionally guaranteed freedom.”).
Despite the persuasive case law language, the Supreme Court expressly
held that there is no First Amendment right to access privately owned
shopping malls to picket or disseminate political information.  See Hudgens,
424 U.S. at 519.  In Hudgens, the Court distinguished the matter before it
from that in Marsh, wherein the Court held that the First Amendment barred
a privately owned municipality from passing statutes which restricted citizens’
rights to free speech on the town’s sidewalks and other “public” areas.  See
Marsh, 326 U.S. at 514.  The Marsh Court stated that a company-owned town,
like any municipality, should have streets/sidewalks readily available for
public discourse. See id. at 507-508  The Hudgens court found “little
resemblance between the shopping center involved in this case and
Chickasaw, Alabama.  There are no homes, there is no sewage disposal plant,
there is not even a post office on this property which the Court now considers
the equivalent of a ‘town.’”  See Hudgens, 424 U.S. at 516 (quoting dissent in
Amalgamated Food Employees v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 330-
31 (1968)).  Thus, to strengthen a First Amendment position for equal Internet
access, one would have to convince the Court that this situation is more
analogous to Marsh than Hudgens.  Note, however, that the California
Supreme Court has followed the Marsh/Logan rationale, holding that citizens
have a free speech right under the California Constitution to access privately
owned shopping malls to deliver political speech and reasonably exercised
petitions. See, e.g., Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 592 P.2d 341, 347
(Cal. 1979), aff’d 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (“As a result of advertising and the lure of
a congenial environment, 25,000 persons are induced to congregate daily to
take advantage of numerous amenities offered by the [shopping center there].
A handful of additional orderly persons soliciting signatures and distributing
handbills in connection therewith, . . . do not interfere with normal business
operations.”).
Although the right to free speech is indeed a fundamental right, it was
not the basis for establishing our public library and school systems.  These
institutions are more firmly rooted in society’s choice to assume the moral and
ethical obligation to educate its masses and to utilize tax dollars to fund these
projects.  Thus, this article relies less on the First Amendment to support its
thesis, and more on the Intellectual Property Clause of the Constitution which
clearly states that the limited rights are to be granted to authors and
inventors in order to promote progress of the sciences (Copyright) and useful
arts (Patents).
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harmonize itself with the moral obligation of public schools and
libraries to provide uniform access to digital information.  As
aptly put by Justice O’Connor,  “[t]he primary objective of
copyright is not to reward the labor of authors, but to promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”190
The White Paper gives lip service to the importance of
copyright law in enabling libraries and educational institutions
to provide equal access to information in order to meet the
constitutionally mandated balance.  Yet, it blatantly rejects a
broad interpretation of fair use to ensure uniform access
because this would unduly “tax” copyright owners.191
The White Paper’s position is replete with contradictions
and fails to consider the acceptable economic and social costs of
protecting intellectual property.  Landes and Posner identify
four costs associated with intellectual property: (1) transfer
cost; (2) rent seeking cost—the cost incurred from duplicative
creations; (3) protection and enforcement; and (4) social cost of
restricting the use of property when it has public good
character.192  They argue that intellectual property rights have
particularly high costs that mandate limiting them in ways
that other property rights are not limited.193
Of all the intellectual property rights, copyright is arguably
subject to the greatest restrictions or “limitations” because it
protects the widest spectrum of “information.”194  Because much
of this information has a “public good” character, e.g., needs to
be accessed for research and education purposes, the Act
190. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340,
349 (1991).
191. White Paper, supra note 2, at 84.  In 1996, Bruce Lehman, Chairman
of the Working Group, organized a Conference on Fair Use (CONFU) which on
November, 1996 submitted non-legislative guidelines for educators and
students who develop multimedia projects using portions of copyrighted
works. See <http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/olia/confu/appendix.htm#j>
(visited April 13, 2000).  In its final paper, however, CONFU merely parrots
the White Paper’s mandate that fair use for digital transmissions will be
viewed as in “traditional environments.”  Because CONFU was comprised of
members favoring owners’ and users’ rights, the members were unable to
agree on a statement regarding uniform Internet access for educational use,
but did draft guidelines for narrow areas such as educational uses of
multimedia works and digital images.
192. Landes & Posner, supra note 169, at 267.
193. See id.
194. Id.  See also 17 U.S.C. § 102 (noting the broad spectrum of written,
audio, visual, and musical works which meet the subject matter requirements
of copyright providing they are merely “original” and “fixed in a tangible
medium of expression”).
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correctly includes limits such as fair use and first sale.  These
limitations enable teachers, researchers, and students to freely
access information for purposes of education, research,
comment, and criticism.  Libraries and public schools are the
primary gatekeepers of information.  It is therefore crucial that
these institutions retain the ability to provide uniform access to
both printed and digital material.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS TO CONGRESS AND THE COURTS
Because the White Paper’s recommendations abolish first
sale and severely narrow fair use, Congress must intervene to
maintain the constitutionally mandated balance for digital
transmissions.  To ensure uniform access to digital
transmissions, Congress should reinforce the fair use and first
sale limitations.  These limitations insulate public schools and
libraries from excessive digital licensing fees, thereby
enhancing their ability to provide uniform access to digital
information.
To maintain the viability of fair use, Congress must reject
the White Paper’s narrow evaluation that limits the doctrine’s
applicability to Internet transmissions.195 To neutralize the
White Paper, Congress might consider amending the 1976
Copyright Act to clarify that the four-factor analysis articulated
in section 107 is equally applicable to hard text and
copyrightable digital transmissions.  Unfortunately, the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 fails to effectively negate the
White Paper’s narrowing of fair use in the digital context.
Instead of addressing section 107 of the Copyright Act directly,
the DMCA generally notes that nothing in the Act affects the
various statutory defenses, including fair use.196
195. Unfortunately, it appears that the House and Senate have opposing
views regarding the viability of the White Paper.  The House version of the
DMCA, H.R. 2281, 106th Cong. (1998), provides limited acknowledgement of
fair use in the digital context, but needs amending to clarify that section 1201
“Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems” will not preclude fair use in
practice.  See Oakley Testimony, supra note 6. In sharp contrast, the Senate
Version of the Act, S. 2037, 106th  Cong. (1998), “lacks any protection for fair
use, encryption research and personal privacy.”  Letter from the American
Association of Law Libraries, Action Alert (Aug. 28, 1998) (urging constituents
to write or fax DMCA Committee members to keep the consumer and personal
protections embodied in the core of the House version of the legislation).
196. Section 1201 states that “nothing in this section shall affect rights,
remedies limitations, or defenses to copyright infringement, including fair use,
under this title.” 17 U.S.C. § 1201(c)(3) (1998).  In addition, section 512 notes
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Maintaining the first sale limitation for digital
transmissions is more problematic than fair use.197  With first
sale, a public school or library always retains an additional
digital “copy” of transmitted information.  Allowing any entity
to retain and distribute more copies than initially purchased
arguably disrupts the balance between rewarding the copyright
owner and universally disseminating information.198  To this
extent, I agree with the White Paper’s analysis that digital
transmissions trigger both the reproduction and distribution
rights of section 106.  Thus, first sale in its present form cannot
apply to digital transmissions.
Nonetheless, Professor Pamela Samuelson suggests a
worthy compromise.  She proposes amending section 109 to
include a provision for Internet transmissions that limits the
application of the first sale rule to situations in which the
digital transmitter did not delete his or her copy.199  I suggest a
friendly amendment to Professor Samuelson’s proposal by
distinguishing that public libraries and schools would be
allowed to retain a “single” additional copy in order to provide
continued access.  Notice of potentially infringing uses could be
required, similar to the notices presently provided by libraries
that the failure of an ISP to qualify under this section does not bear adversely
on the ISP’s ability to qualify for other defenses (such as fair use).  Id. § 512.
The DMCA does revise the section 108 library exemption for preservation of
certain works to reflect the unique nature of digital transmissions. Pub.L.No.
105-304 § 404  Thus, it remains a mystery why Congress chose to ignore
updating such crucial limitations such as section 109 first sale and section 107
fair use.  See Band, Comments on the Digital Millenium Copyright Act (visited
November 25, 1998) <http://www.ala.org/washoff/band.html> (copy of
document on file with author) (noting that section 404 of the DMCA updates
section 108 of the 1976 Copyright Act to “allow libraries and archives to take
advantage of digital technologies when engaging in specified preservation
activities”).
197. Unfortunately, the DMCA is conspicuously silent concerning the
White Paper’s abolishing of the first sale limitation for digital transmissions,
thereby  ignoring the discrepancy that presently exists between the
distribution of  hard text and digital transmissions.
198. Indeed, this is the premise behind limiting the first sale doctrine to
the “distribution right.”  See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
199. See Samuelson, supra note 36.  She further notes that:
[E]ven without an abolition of the First Sale Rule, copyright owners
can control this kind of potential consumer abuse of copyrighted
works by means of the exclusive reproduction right.  If the owner of a
copy of digitally transmitted work begins transmitting copies of that
copy to a thousand of his or her closest friends, that person will be
responsible for multiple reproductions of copyrighted works.
Id. at 24.
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at copying machines.200
Alternatively, if Congress disagrees with a library
exemption for first sale, it could require libraries to temporarily
delete their copy to “lend” the information, and require a
“check-out” mechanism that allows for reinstating the copy
when the patron “returns” (ceases using) the disseminated
information.
Finally, if Congress is uncomfortable with carving out
numerous exceptions to first sale, it could create a compulsory
licensing scheme for Internet transmissions.  A royalty tribunal
would establish a tiered licensing scheme enabling public
schools, libraries, and other non-profit entities to pay lower
royalties.  This proposal is consistent with the FCC’s
commitment to subsidizing telecommunications costs for public
schools and libraries to ensure universal Internet access.201
Copyright owners would retain their incentive to create
under the various proposals.  To reward copyright owners,
licensing schemes remain in place for commercial and non-
educational/research uses.  Meanwhile, liberally applying first
sale and fair use helps public schools and libraries meet their
moral and ethical obligation of providing uniform access to
Internet technology, while simultaneously promoting “Progress
of the Arts and Science.”  This paradigm harmonizes
intellectual property law with Internet ethics.
CONCLUSION
In this high technology era, children of all income levels
need access to both printed and electronic information.
Although increased government funding is one answer, we
must also address how to balance the intellectual property
rights that attach to digital transmissions against our moral
obligation to educate and disseminate information.  Congress
and the courts should reject the White Paper’s limitation on
fair use and stand firm on equitably applying this doctrine to
Internet transmissions.  Also, Congress must preserve “first
sale” for Internet transmissions to allow non-infringing
200. See 17 U.S.C. § 108(f)(1) (“Nothing in this section- (1) Shall be
construed to impose liability for copyright infringement upon a library or
archives or its employees for the unsupervised use of reproducing equipment
located on its premises, provided that such equipment displays a notice that
the making of a copy may be subject to the copyright law.”).
201. See supra note 10.
116 MINNESOTA INTELL. PROP. REVIEW [Vol. 1:79
transfers of digital transmissions.  Johnny’s becoming
productive in a high technology environment turns on his
ability to not only read printed text, but also to access and
manipulate digital information.
